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C&PrnRI
Aristophanes' Criticism of the Sophists
The history of Athens during the epoch which began with
the final defeat of the Persians and ended at the close of the
Peloponnesian war has justly inspired many to eloquence in recording it.

It was a period comparable in its brilliance with

the Age of Louis XIV and in the quality and quantity of its artistic production inferior to no epoch of similar length.

During

that time Athens arose from an obscure Greek city to a recognized
imperial power, enjoying political sway and prestige greater than
it had previously known or would regain; while in its home government the city achieved what has been called "the first and
most complete

democ~acy

more impressive than the

the world has ever seen. 8 1However, even
resul~achieved

rapidity with which they occurred.

during this Age is the

In a comparatively brief span

of years this small city accomplished more in various fields of
endeavor than ordinarily results from the labor and experience of
a nation through centuries.

The dominant note of the age, at

least until the Peloponnesian War checked its progress, was rapid
growth.
Consequently the Athens of a decade after the Persian wars
was greatly different from the city which had fought the Marathon; and the living conditions to which the citizen of this
later day had to adapt himself were in many respects entirely new
and still rapidly changing the political security of the city, -
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the fertile soil in which a stong

was grow-

~perial-mindedness

ing,- its wealth, its power, and the consequences of these, were
circumstances in sharp contra.$1 to those in which the citizen of
older Athens had lived.

The man who formerly had been hard

pressed to earn his living and protect his land now found leisure
time to spend at the court, the assembly, or the theatre.
tions hitherto unthought of were now opened to him.

Voca-

Trade on a

vastly increased scale sent the adventurous to far away ports
and brought the world to the door of the Athenian who stayed at
home.
It is hardly remarkable that in thls growing Athens there
should arise an imperative need for a
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K11, which had prepared the youth for the simpler life

of older Athens, was not sufficient to equip him for the complex
life of the modern city.

A new education was demanded, which

would be more practical, would embrace a wider field of knowledge, and above all wouid give the student that skill in speech
and argument now so necessary for successful participation in
the life of Athens.
Out of these needs of the time and others to be considered
later grew a new education represented by the educators generally referred to as the Sophists.

Because these Sophists offered

a training which did at least partially fUlfill the

require~

menta of the age, and because they were, many of them,

L
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unquestionably capable

men~

they quickly gained favor in Athens

and soon took almost complete possession of the educational
field.
Yet although they enjoyed great popularity in
also met with intense and often bitter opposition.
were those

who~

dominantly evil
its spread.

Athens~

they

For there

feeling that the Sophists' education was a preinfluence~

took what means they could to check

Sometimes they managed to have the writings of the

Sophists burned and their authors exiled.

More

often~

however~

they contented themselves with attacking the new education in
books and speeches.

Plato and later Aristotle wrote against the

exponents of the new

learning~

as a weapon against them.
of the

day~

while !socrates used his eloquence

Aristophanes~

the leading poet comic

made the new culture the butt of his satire and

ridicule.
An appalling amount of literature has been written about

the

Sophists~

antagonistic.
.History

2f

the bulk of which for a long time was decidedly
In recent

times~

however~

Grote included in his

Greece an impressive defence of these men, which has

been very influential in turning the tide of criticism in their
favor.

At present there is a bewildering disparity of opinion

among those who would appraise the education offered by the
Sophists; and in the great mass of what may be called controversial writing on the subject can be found an astonishing variety of ingenious

defenses~

attacks, and attempts at compromise.
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In

the course of the controversy the defenders of the

Sophists have called into question the validity of much of the
testimony of contemporaries and near contemporaries of these
educators.

In

general, they have argued either that the author

of the testimony was prejudiced, or that he misinterpreted the
teachings of the Sophists, or that he himself has been misinterpreted, or that he was insincere.

These arguments seem to

have particular force when applied to the testimony against the
Sophists found in Aristophanes' Clouds.

For if it is possible

to question the impartiality of Aristotle or !socrates, or to
doubt about the interpretation or sincerity of Plato, what can
be said of Aristophanes,- a comic poet, forced by the nature of
his art to present his characters in a humorous garb, and cQmpelled by the tradition of Greek comedy to write as a conservative?

Consequently, it has become fairly common to reject

Aristophanes 1 testimony entirely and to consider him either as
an insincere comedian or as a prejudiced and

~competent

critic.

Thoroughly to investigate the justice and sincerity of
Aristophanes' attack in the Clouds upon the new education is the
task of a discourse of greater pretensions than this; while to
arrive at an assured decision about the matter is probably an
impossible aim in any treatise.

However progress in the investi

gation can be made, and the probabilities of the case can to so
extent be indicated even in such a small work as this.

To

achieve these results within the limits of such a discussion, it
be necessar

to restrict the material considered f

5

most part to Aristophanes' own works, particularly the Clouds,
and to the writings of contemporaries and near contemporaries of
the Sophists in as much as these contain fragments of the
Sophists• teachings, interpretations of these, or other pertinen
testimony about the Sophists and their education.

Other litera-

ture on the Sophists and Aristopbanes will be treated only in so
far as it is necessary for a fair discussion of the proper
material of this dissertation.
In order that procedure may be clear, it will be useful to

state at the beginning certain principle which have been assumed
as the starting points for the investigation of the justice of
Aristophanes' critidSm of the new learning.

Firstly, when there

is general agreement among ancient authors in their testimony
regarding

~he

Sophists, the testimony must be accepted as at

least probably true.

To prove such testimony false or even im-

probable seemB hardly possible, since the only material on which
this proof could be baaed- actual writings of the Sophists contradicting this testimony- is not to be had.

Secondly, even the

testimony of one ancient author which is not contradicted in

~

other ancient literature is to be accepted as probable, unless
there is a very good reason to suspect the author's prejudice or
incompetence.

Thirdly, as a rule the testimony of an author is

to be interpreted in the most evident and generally accepted
sense.

Of course, passages in which the meaning is obscure and

evidently open to dispute will not be used as proof.
therefore

if the bulk of ancient testimon

concerni

Lastly,
the

c
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Sophists and their education corroborates for the most part
Aristophanes' testimony, and if, of course, the conde poet's censure is of truly blameworthY qualities, then the attack on the
new learning made in the Clouds must be held at least probably
to be just.
The procedure in broad outline, then, will be as follows:
first an analysis will be made of Aristophanes 1 attack on the new
learning; secondly, this attack will be controlled as far as ·
possible by the testimony of other contemporaries of the Sophistq
thirdly, weasons will be given, drawn for the most part from the
ture of Aristophanes' other plays and from the knowledge of the
character of the author which these plays afford us, for the belief that Aristophanea 1 was sincere in his criticism.

In the

treatment of Aristophanes' sincerity the question of the blameorthiness of the qualities censured will be considered in so
ar as this is necessary.

For the most part, however, it will be

immediately evident from the mere analysis of his criticism that
he new education, if it was as he painted it, was certainly
orthy of censure.
Let us begin, then, with an analysis of the attack on the
ew learning which Aristophanes makes in the Clouds.2) As everyknows the comic situation of the play arises from the
udicrous representation of the effects of the new education
pon its disciples.

Socrates 3)is chosen as the chief Sophist on.

epresentative of the new culture.

I

He runs ac:pfoVTliJT"YYfloV
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or thinking house, where men can learn mostly anything but
chiefly how to defend with persuasive speech the unjust cause.
strepsiades, to learn this art, which will enable him to cheat

'
'
hiS son's creditors, asr:a~'.laS't resaz.t,applies for instruction
.

at the thinking house.

After a few futile efforts to learn,

strepsiadea realizes that he is too old and determines to force
his son# Phidippides, to undergo the training in his stead.

The

boy# though an unwilling pupil at first, is finally turned out
a true Sophist.

His

father is over-joyed, and, armed with a

sophism or two from Phidippides and with a few of his own making
he succeeds in sending his son's creditors away empty-handed.
However, his joy is short-lived, and he soon makes some unpleasant discoveries about the true effects of sophistic education.

His son can now beat him and then prove the justice of

his act by clever sophistic arguments.

Worse than this, the

boy declares himself ready to prove that it is right for him to
beat his mother, too.

This is too much for Strepsiades, whose

eyes have been opened at last.

He repents

~f

his desertion of

traditional beliefs and begins his reform by burning the thinking house of the Sophists.
Aristophanes fills in the skeleton of this simple plot
humorous

wi~

incidents, satirical verse, and high poetry, most of

which is directed against the new learning.

An·analysis shows

that it is a criticism of several qualities

of this culture and

its representatives.

First of all there is some :1humorous

8

description of the
Sophists~

dress~

appearance, and mode of life of the

which hardly seems to be of much importance, but which

in fairness we must

consider~

since it could possibly be used as

an argument against the sincerity and justice of Aristophanes'
criticism.

Of grave importance, however, is the criticsm of the

ethics of the new learning, which represents it as inculcating
a contempt for law,
from nature.

justice~

and morality, and divorcing these

Closely allied with this criticsm is the censure

of two features of the education which are frequent targets for
the stinging darts of the poet's satire,- the sophistic art of
disputation and the sophistic rhetoric.

Religious

skepticism~

too, is represented as an undesirable quality inherent in the
new culture.

The representatives of the new learning are

ridiculed for professing a kind of polymathy and for charging
fees for their instruction.

Lastly, we may consider as a sepa-

rate criticism- though it is really an aspect of the criticism of
the above mentioned qualities of the sophistic education~ristophanes1

insistence upon the pernicious eventual effects of

this new culture.

Let us consider these criticisms more in

detail.
With regard to Aristophanes 1 humorous description of the
Sophists' appearance and mode of life we may be brief.

According

to the poet's picture the exponents of the new learning are hardly a handsome

lot~

nor does the training improve the appearance

pf the subjected to it.

The professors

are~

9

"Pale-faced wretches and bare-footed fellows" 4)
of whom

"Though frugality none ever shaved or annointed himself or went to a bath to wash himself." 5)

Phidippides fears to submit to their training, lest he
"Should not dare to look upon the knights,
having lost all my colour;" 6)
and when Socrates assures Strepsiadea that the boy will come out
of the training a true and clever Sophist, the youth remarks
that he'll rather come out "A ghastly and miserable

creature."~

Finally in the debate the Just Logie, closing his defense of the
traditional education, assures Phidippea that if he gives himself to the modern training, he will have "A pallid complexion,
small shoulders, a narrow cheat."

8)

For the present this will

suffice for our consideration of this type of humorous description.

We shall have occasion to return to it again briefly at

the end of the chapter, when dealing with Aristophanea' representation of the effects of the new learning.
The new education is represented 1n the Clouds as embracing
a most noxious ethics; and if the picture is painted with clever
wit and humour, it is drawn none the less with clearness and
precision.

The new educators have a complete contempt for law,

justice, and morality, which they hold to be entirely divorced
from the supreme guide, nature.

The Unjust Logie, representing

yhe new culture in the debate between the traditional and innovating education, does not hesitate to state that "There is no
justice at all;" 9)

and he brags: "For I have been called among

10

the deep thinkers the worse cause, on this very account that I
first contrived to speak against both law and justice."

10)

That Aristophanes' Sophists considered this law and
justice to be mere convention and quite divorced from nature is
clear.

Thus, when Strepsiades, wishing to escape an imminent

beating from his son, exclaims, "It is nowhere ordained by law
that a father should suffer this," the boy's answer

is~

Was it not then a man like you and me who
first preposed this law, and by speaking
persuaded the ancients? Why then is it
less lawful for me also in turn to propose
henceforth a new law for the sons, that
they should beat th6ir fathers in turn?
11)
Then he strengthens his argument by an appeal to nature, showing
that nature and this law at variance are:
Observe the cocks and these other animals,
how they pundsh their fathers; and yet,
in what do they differ from us, except
that they do not write decrees.:'!::~)
We may pause here to note Strepsiades'surprisingly clever rejoinder, though it is not particularly pertinent to our present
discussion,
Why then, since you imitate the cock in
all things, do you not both eat dung and
sleep on a perch?
To which Phidippides answers weakly, "It is not the same thing,
my friend, nor would it seem so to Socrates."
Again, in the debate we find the Unjust Logic boldly
representing what he calls \V\ s
as in conflict with accepted morality:

11
Well, I will pass from thence to the
necessities of our nature. You have gone
astray, you have fallen in love, you have been
guilty of some adultery, and then you have
been caught. 12}
Clearly,for him

adulte~J,

though a sin against the traditional

moral code,. is quite according to the nature of man.
We may use the passage last quoted, together with the next
few sentences of the Unjust Logic, to show the intimate connection between the false ethics of Aristophanes' Sophists and that
feature of their education which we have now to consider- their
art of disputation.

The Unjust Logic goes on to say 13) that

a youth caught in.adultery, for example, is indeed in a sorry
plight, if his only education has been in the school of the Just
Logic: "You are lost, for you are unable to speak."

vv.hile on

the contrary, if the boy has been trained in the disciplt-tre of
the new learning, he will be well prepared for such a situation:
But if you associate with me, indulge your
nature, dance, laugh, consider nothing
shameful. If you happen to be taken as an
adulterer, you will answer him thus, that
you have done him no wrong; then refer him to
Zeus, saying that even he is overcome by love
of women; and yet how could you, being a
mortal, be more powerful than a god.
To be able to argue so cleverly is the guaranteed result of

.

training in the sophistic art of disputation,- an art to be used
as an effective and necessary weapon by the young Sophist who,
having learned to contemn law and morality, wishes to.indulge
his nature with impunity.

It is an art whose purpose is not to

bring objective truth to light, but to conquer the opponent,

12
regardless

o~

what he

de~ends.

It is for those who, as Strep-

siades puts it, wish "to conquer in speaking, right or

wrong.'~4

It is possible to cite passage after passage in which
Aristophanes describes, exemplifies, and ridicules this sophistic art.

He calls it,,A

oyw,.. ; K[ 1f3wv

o-x /y$..;~ rl.. )1 o t

,_, IS")

He has Strepsiades tell his son that among the Sophists
are botn~the causes, the better, whichever that is, and the worse. And one
of these two causes, the worse, speaking
unjust things, prevails.
16)
And the old man begs that the boy may learn from the Sophists
These two causes, the better, whatever
it may be, and the worse, which by
maintaining what is unjust overturns
the better. If not both, at any rate
the unjust one by all means. 17)

In the debate the Just Logic says

o~

the Unjust Logic:

And he will persuade you to consider
everything that is base to be honorable
and what is honorable to be base. 18)
~

.•

It is particularly in the many examples he gives of this
~·

...

~

art i~ ~peratio~ that Aristophanes shows the means it employs
to gain victory,- the quibbles and refined subleties to which
he refers so often. 19)

Thus, we find Socrates demonstrating

his ability to trip up an opponent in ru.discussion about the
gender of ~A e.~Tpv~V or \'(,:fc::fo~o..s) 20)

and we hear the newly

made Sophist, Phidippides, teach his father: a neat sophism about
the old and new day, with which Strepsiades may evade his

'

creditors. 2',)

Then there are the sophistic arguments by which

P.hidippides proves that it is right for a son to beat his

13

rather,

22)

or the clever quibbles and sophistries of the de-

bate where the unjust logic answers the charges brought against
him and shows that warm baths are not enervating (since the
Herculean baths are warm, and surely no man is superior in
stre~-~

to Herculesl), that living in the market place is good

for youths, that boys should exercise their tongues, that purity
is no virtue but a vice.
in

23)

The method here, as generally
'

the Clouds, is to ridicule the feature of sophistic education

by reducing it to an absurdity.
It is difficult in analysing Aristophanes 1 criticism of
the new education to distinguish between his censure of the
sophistic are of disputation and his criticism of the rhetoric
of the Sophists.

However, it is sufficiently clear that he does

ridicule the Sophists for emphasizing a rhetoric, which,while it
may be closely allied to and employed by the art
is something different from it.

or

disputation,

It is an over-emphasis on the

externals of speech, resulting in a kin!i of delight in speaking
merely for the sake of speaking.

It is because of this over-

emphasis of empty rhetorical form that Aristophanes' Sophists
are accused of teaching boys to exercise their tongues too much
and to chatter idly in the market place, and are represented
as worshipping "This Chaos and the Clouds and the Tongue."

24)

It is these Clouds who supply the Sophists with "Circumlocution
and bamboozling and over-mastering;"

25) while the Sophists in

turn celebrate the Clouds in verse, writing in elegant but

14
rather empty style of
The on-rush1n 1 might or the light-stoppin'
rain-droppin 1 Cloud.
And the thousand black curls which the
Tempest lord whirls.
26}
To be trained in such rhetoric would be dangerous tor a boy; so
the Just Logic warns Phidippides that he must reject the new
culture if he is to be saved at all and "Not merely practice
loquacity."

27)

Very much of the decidedly uncomplimentary epithets burled
at the Sophists in the Clouds refer to the false ethics of sophistic education or to the art of disputation and empty rhetoric
which it emphasized.

We are told, for instance, that a disciple

of the new learning can become "In oratory a tricky knave, a
thorough rattle, a subtle speaker."

28)

By giving himself to

the new education Strepsiades hopes
To appear to men to be bold,
glib of tongue, audacious, impudent,
a fabricat~r~ of lies, a practised knave
in law-suits, a law-tablet, a thorough
rattle, a fox, etc.
29)
Examples of this could be multiplied, for Aristopbanes waB
remarkably ingenious in coining epithets and apparently took
delight in exercising his talent.

Those given, however, are

representative and sufficient.
There is no lack of definiteBess in Aristopbanes r description of the attitude of his Sophists toward religion.

They are

clearly skeptics in religious matters and quite out of a,mpathy
with the traditional belief.

Socrates "Looks down upon the gods

15

from his basket; "

30}

and he is careful to explain to. Strep-

siades that the "Gods are not a current coin with us."

31)

For the Clouds. the source from which the Sophists receive their
subtle learning, "Alone are goddesses; and all the rest is nonsense."

32)

We may recall. the passage in which Socrates, with clever,·
sophistical arguments, dethrones Zeus and proves that Vortex
reigns.

33)· Finally he convinces Strepsiades that the only

real gods are Chaos 1 the Clouds, and the Tongue, and so completely does he win over his pupil that the old man declares
his apostasy with enthusiasm and vehemence:
I would not even converse with the others
(the traditional gods), not even if I met
them; nor would I sacrifice to them, nor
make libations, nor offer frankincense. 34)
Later, after his brief sojourn among the Sophists, Strepsiades
can tell his son, "How good a thing is learning.
.Juppiter,"

35)

There is no

and inform his creditors that ".Juppiter,·

sworn by, is ridiculous to knowing ones."

36)

However, he

learns to repent of his apostasy; and when at the end of the
play, he is beginning his reformation by burning the thinking
house, he calls out:
Chase, pelt, smite them; for many reasons, but
especially because you know that they
offended against the gods. 3'7)
It is evident, then, that the Sophists of the Clouds
are as skeptical about traditional :religion as they are about
traditional morality; .~and that they have as little reverence

16

tor the gods as they have for law and justice.
The precise point of Aristopbanes' ridicule of the scientific trend of his Sophists' education is not ent1re1y clear.
From the general spirit of the passages concerned with the
science of the new learning, one might judge that Aristophanes
is representing his Sophists as quacks or
and he does speak of them as yt- 't. T £..

UJ

pseudo-scientists~
I

p o ~ t: Vex. k £ S

However, the point is obscure and difficult to prove.

3

F)

It is

more eleazt• it seens to me, that he is satirizing the Sophistic
education for embracing a ridiaulously large field of knowledge.

Besides the art of rhetoric and of disputation which

the new educators teach (and these arts, it may be added, inelude a lmowledge of scientific grammar and of versification. 39) ~
a· startling number of sciences may be learned from them.
fact, one can learn from

thea.~tever

In

wisdom is amongst men.a

These men "investigate the courses of the moon and her
revolutions"

41)

40-

and are "in search of things below the

They "grope about under Tartarus,"

43)

while

their "rump is taught astronomy alone by itself."

44)

Nothing

earth. "

42)

is too trifling to be worthy of their consideration - not even
a flea and the question of how many feet of its own it
jumped,

45)

or a gnat and the difficult problem of how it

buzzes.

46)

Perhaps the point to be made is not established

with sufficient clearness by these isolated quotations.

How-

ever from the context in which they occur and from the general
spirit of Aristophanas' representation of the science taught by

~------------------------------------------~
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the new educators it is evident that these Sophists pride
themselves on possessing and teaching an absurdly vast amount
of scientific knowledge, and this knowledge, when examined,
proves to be of a doubtful character.
Only twice does Aristophanes refer to the fact that his
sophists charge for their instructionJ but his rare thrusts at
this foible are quick and deft and neatly humorous.
siades, praising the Sophists to his son, says that

Strep"~ese

men

teach," and before complet 1ng his sentence 1 hastens to add the
parenthetical remark, "If one gives them money."

47)

~e

second reference occurs when Socrates first meets Phidippides
and, finding him an uncouth boy1 wonders how such a pupil can
ever learn the art of sophistry.

He fmmediately reflects that

there is some hope, since "Hyperbolus learnt this at the cost
of a talent."

48)

~ese

two references, though they stand

alone, are clear 1n this meaning; and they will help us to
identify Aristophanes• Sophists.
In

concluding this analysis of Aristophanes' criticism

of the Sophists in the Clouds, it should be remarked that the
poet is chiefly concerned 1n the play with a representation of
the effects of sophistic education.

He ridicules the theories

and methods of his Sophists by reducing their logical consequences to an absurdity.

Of course, at least a partial ex-

planation of this emphasis of effects is to be found in the
necessity of concrete representation which Aristophanes' pro-

~--------------------------------------.
18
tession of comic poet imposed upon him.

Satirizat1on and

ridi~~

of methods and theories in the abstract is hardly the stuff of
which good comedies are made; while by means of an imaginative.
and concrete representation of the effects of these the purpose
of comedy can be well achieved.

Yet the insistence in the

Clouds upon the evil effects of sophistic training is so great
that one might reasonably suspect Aristophanes of making a deliberate effort to awaken people to a realization of the dangers
of this education.

Such a

suspicion~

of

course~

must rest upon

the assumption that .Aristophanes is sincere in his criticism in
the Clouds - an assumption the validity of which we shall not
undertake to discuss until a later chapter.
However~

regardless of what its complete explanation may

b~

the fact remains that much stress is laid upon the evil consequences of the new learning.

This, I think, is already clear,

both from the brief summary of the plot of the play and from the
analysis of the criticlam of the new learning.
seems at particular pains to

show~what

Aristophanes

use the ordinary man will

inevitably put such a dangerous instrument as the sophistic art
of disputation.
learn to the

art~

Strepsiades has but one reason for wanting to
- that he may not have to pay "to anyone not

even an obolus of these debts;" 49)

and no sooner has he learn-

ed a few of the tricks of the art from Phidippides than he im~ediately

uses them to cheat his creditors.

That the

common~

of men will want to use the art for similar purposes, the Clouds

19

assure Strepsiades:
Many will be seated at your gates, (if you
have learned this art) wishing to communicate
with you, to consult you as to actions and
affidavits of many talents as is worthy of
your abilities.
50)
The logical effect of the ethical teaching of the new educat6rs is exemplified in the newly-made Sophist, Phidippides,
who, having learned that traditional morality is an empty convention, divorced from nature, loses even such a fundamental virtue
as respect for parents. 51)

Then the new education is repre-

sented as having a weakening and softening effect on the youths,
52)

since it causes them to spend their time in idle chatter in the
market place rather than in physical exercise and games. 53)
Another effect of the new education is the fostering of indecency
in youths. 54)

In the debate the Just Logic paints an attract-

ive picture of the youths trained in the old school, who were
modest even to the extent of covering their thigh in the school
of the gymnastic-master; while by contrast he says that the
youths of the present day, trained by the new educators, are
quite without a sense of modesty but have a great lewdness.

The

Unjust Logic makes no attempt to deny that this is so but rather
undertakes to prove that boys should not be pure. 55)

Likewise,

Phidippides, when he has learned sophistry, no longer cares for
Simonides or Aeschylus, but prefers a shady passage from
Euripides. 56)
It is evident from all this that Aristophanes, whether

,....-~--------------------------------------------------------------~
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sincerely or not, represents the new learning as a corrnpting
influence which has already caused much harm in Athens and vvhich
is likely to cause more in the fUture.
education of the day.

For it is the dominant

That is why the Unjust Logic appears in

the luxurious robes of the prosperous citizen, though in the
olden days he was a beggar, and the formerly popular Just Logic
is a shamefully squalid outcast. 57)
plains bitterly of the madness of

And the Just Logic com-

Athens,~ich

(the Unjust Logic) who ruin her youths." 58)

supports you

He seems to find

his only solace in the thought that the Unjust Logic

'~ill

be

found out some time or other by the Athenians, what sort of
doctrines you teach the simple-minded." 59)
Such, then, is Aristophanes 1 criticism of the new education
It is a criticism of an education characterized by an attitude
of thorough-going skepticism and tending to sanction complete
self-expression.

By destroying faith in moral law the new learn-

ing sows the seeds of the pernicious doctrine that the only sin

is to resist an impulse of the great god nature.

Whether this

criticism is corroborated by the testimony of other ancient
authors, and whether Aristophanes is a sincere critic, it is the
work of the succeeding chapters to investigate.
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Notes to Chapter I
1. Lord, Louis E.,

Aristophanes

p. 23

2. The Clouds is not the first nor the only play 1n which
Aristophanes attacked the new learning. The Daiteles, a lost
play which was the author's first work, ridiculed the new
education by contrasting it with yhe better education of the
old days. In other plays Aristophanes occasionally pokes fun
at some feature or representative of the new culture.

s.

In the chapter on the sincerity of Aristophanes something will
be said about this peculiar choice of Socrates as the leading
representative of the sophistic education.

4. Clouds 1. 103

5. Clouds 11. 835-37
6. Clouds 11. 119-20
7. Clouds 1. 1112 (Translated by W. W. Merry in a note to his
edition of Clouds.)

8. Clouds 11. 1016-17
9. Clouds 1. 902 (My translation}
10. Clouds 11. 1038-40
11. Clouds 11. 1420-32
12. Clouds 11. 1075-76
13. Clouds 11. 1077-82 (My translation)
14. Clouds 11. 98-99

15. Clouds 1. 130
16. Clouds 11. 112-15 (My translation)
17. Clouds 11. 882-85
18. Clouds 11. 1019-21
19. e.g.: rron this account, therefore, my soul, having heard
their voice, flutters and already seeks to discourse subtiley, and to quibble about smok~, and having pricked a maxim with a little notion, to refute the opposite argument.rr
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"Who while learning some little petty quibbles"

(1. 630)

"And I am acquainted with subtle thoughts, and arguments, and
speculations." (1. 104}
20. Clouds 11. 658 sq.
21. Clouds 11. 1178 sq.
22. Clouds 1405 sq.
23. Glouds ll. 1045 sq.
24. l. 424 Clouds
25. Clouds 1.318 (Translated by W. W. Merry in note to his
edition or the Clouds.)
26. Clouds 11. 335-36 (Translated by B. B. Rogers. His translation or these lines is not literal but captures the
spirit.)
27. Clouds

1. 931

28. Clouds 1.260
29. Clouds ·u~ -444~~1 ,~
30. Clouds l. 226
31. Clouds 11. 247-8
32. Clouds 1. 365
33. Clouds 11. 366 sq.
34. Clouds 11. 425-6
35. Clouds 11. 826-7
36. Clouds 1 .. 1241
37. Clouds 11. 1508-9
38. Clouds 1. 333
39. cr. the discourse on gender already referred to (11. 658 sq.
line 638 "about measures, rythms, or verses."

40. Clouds 1. 841
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4l.Clouds l. 171
42. Clouds l. 188
43. Clouds l. 192
44. Clouds 1. 194
45. Clouds 11. 144 sq.
46. Clouds 11. 156 sq.
47. Clouds 1. 98
48. Clouds l. 876
49. Clouds 1. 116
50. Clouds 1. 466
51. Of. note 11
52. Of. notes

6~

7, 8.

53. Clouds 11. 1002-5
54. I think there is no evidence that Aristophanes intended to
extend the Charge of this type of immorality to the
Sophists themaelves.
55. Clouds 11. 961 sq.
56. Clouds 11. 1361 sq.
57. Clouds 11. 920 sq.
58.

~louds

11. 926-7

59. Clouds 11. 918-19

Note:

Unless otherwise indicated the translation of the above
passages has been taken from w. J. Rickie's translation
of the Clouds in Bohn 1 s Classical Library.
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CHAPTER II
Brief HistO£Y of the SOphist Movement
Before proceeding to a consideration of other ancient
testimony concerning the new education and its representatives,
it will be necessary to make some study of the origin, development, and nature of this education as we know it from impartial
history.

Without such a study it would be impossible clearly

to show that Aristophanes' criticism and the evidence given by
other writers refer to the same culture.

Furthermore, in this

historical discussion we may find confirmation of part of the
comic poet's attack.
Since this new learning is commonly referred to as
sophistic education and its exponents are usually called the
Sophists, we must begin with an explanation of the various uses
I

of the word u-o cp1a-111s or Sophist.

The term as it is used today

has all of the unsavory connotation of quack or fraud; yet
originally the name had anything but an opprobrious signification.

/

In its first meaning o-o <{Jt~/ns signifies simply an ex-

pert, whether it be in science, art, or craft.
sense in which Cratinus 1)

This is the

applies the name to Homer and Hesi

Androtion to the Seven Sages, 2)

and Herodotus 3)

founders of the cult of Dionysius.

to the

In Liddell and Scott we find

that in this primary meaning the name was often used with modal
·

such as

. .--.

TUJV

e.

--.

1 .--,

\

(~pwV {»£,..v.rv a-'Lihv'

adepts of very diverse character.

t

I

l..lf1T£t~ll

to designate

According to this usage the

~
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sophist is but one or another kind of wise man.

However, after

a time the name acquired a meaning very different from its
original signification and one much more restricted.

In this

second sense the title of the Sophist was given to those who
accepted as their profession the imparting of wisdom for money.
The name as it was used with this signification quickly acquired
many connotations of a distinctly uncomplimentary character, of
which we shall have more to say presently.

The precise time at

which the word began to be used in its more specific sense can
hardly be determined.

It is customary to hold Plato responsible

for its introduction and popularization; 4)

and whether the

responsibility is truly his or not, it is certain that from his
time on the title was more commonly used and understood in its
restricted meaning.
It is evident, then, that in general anciemt writers used
the word Sophist in two quite different senses.

Unfortunately,

these authors did not feel a very strict obligation to adopt a
consistent usage of the term, or to inform the

reade~'the

meaning

they intendeditto have 1n any particular passage. 5)

However,

this does not cause much difficulty, as it is usually

sufficie~b

ly easy to ascertain in which of the two general meanings an
author is using the word.

Neither does much confusion arise

from the rather large extension of the term in its first meaning.
The greatest source of difficulty is found in the looseness with
which the name is applied 1n its second and restricted sense.

~

----------------------------------------------------------------~
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For even when we are sure that an author is speaking

o~

the

sophists in the more specific sense, it is often somewhat hard to
knOW

certainly the precise meaning he wished to convey by thei

word and consequently exactly whom he intends-to designate by
it. 6)
On the other hand, however, we must not exaggerate the
looseness of usage, nor believe it impossible to deterttdne the
meaning intended by an acient author speaking of the Sophists.
Ordinarily, the meaning can be ascertained with a fair degree of
precision; but evidently for this a certain amount of carefulness
is required.
For our own purposes, while some accuracy in determining
the meaning and application of the word as used by a given author
is absolutely necessary, too great precision in this regard is
not required.

For we are interested in the Sophists only in so

far as they are the men whom Aristophanes attacked in the Clouds;
and we are concerned with ancient testimony about the Sophists
only in as much as this testimony is useful in increasing our
knowledge of these men and their education.
Now while we can be quite certain, I think, about the
class of men in general with whom the Clouds is concerned, we c
not hope to know definitely and completely what individuals
Aristophanes meant to include in that class.
the word Sophist in the Clouds only once; 7)

He himself uses
and it would be

hard in this case to say certainly what meaning he is giving the

~
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term.

On the other hand, it is evident that he is criticizing

in general the exponents of a new education which had come into
vogue in the Athens of his day.

That such a new education did

come into favor in fifth century Athens is generally admitted,
though modern authors dispute about the precise points in which
this education was distinct from the old.

It is likewise

commonly conceded that the exponents of this new culture were in
general those ordinarily designated in ancient literature by the
name Sophist used in its more specific sense.

Consequently,

although in a given instance we may not be able to determine all
the individuals an author means to include under the name Sophia
and precisely what signification he is giving the word, still hi
testimony may be useful to us in verifying Aristophanes' criticism, provided we can be sure at least that it refers in general
to these professors of the new learning.
Now from our point.of vantage today we can see with some
clarity that those responsible for the introduction and popularization of a new education in Periclean Athens were the same
Sophists about whom Plato writes.

They were Protagoras, Gorgias,

Hippias, Produus, Euthydemus, Thrasymachus, Antiphon, lriti•s,
and their pupils and successors.

Are these the men to whom

Aristophanes is referring in the Clouds?

Certainly, in as much

as he is attacking the culture for which they are chiefly responsible, he is attacking them.

How many of them he wished to in-

clude explieitly in his attack, it seems impossible to know.

He

""
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refers to Proditt{s in the Clouds, when the Chorus says: "For we
would not hearken to any other of the present meteorological
sophists, except to Prodifts;" 8)

and in the Birds he speaks of

Gorgias, saydng:
There is a knavish race who live by their
tongues, who reap, and sow, and gather in
the vintage, and pluck ripe grapes with
their tongues; and they are barbarians in
race, Gorgiases and Phili~pi. 9)

,

rrJA:s.:t~~tl.ep.

however, he does not speak explicitly of indivi-

dual exponents of the new learning. 10)
Again, we can not know whether he meant to include men
whom we do not today reckon among the representatives of sophistic culture.

We must transmit for the time the discussion of

his apparent inclusion of Socrates among the Sophists.

For the

rest, it is entirely possible that he himself was not quite
clear in his own mind as to precisely what individuals he meant
to attack.

He did not have to be.

In general he knew and made

it clear that he was chiefly criticizing the new culture and
those paid professors who were the exponents of it.
In comparing, then, Aristophanes' testimony with that of

other ancient writers, we shall look in these writers for
evidence concerning the new learning in Athens and its exponents.

It is safe, in general, to accept the Platonic sophists

as the champions of this new education.
The question may now be asked, did these sophists, whom
we are to consider as the chief objects of Aristophanes' attack,

rr·-.. - - - - - - - - - - - a
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and for evidence about whom we are to search in ancient literature, constitute a school or sect with common unifying
doctrines recognized by all?
discussed in modern times.

T.his problem has been much
Grote is firm in his stand against

all attempts to attribute strong bonds of unity to the socalled Sophistic School.

He says:

It is impossible, therefore, to predicate
anything concerning doctrines, methods, or
tendencies common and peculiar to all
sophists. There were none such; nor has
the abstract word "Die Sophistik" any real
meaning, except such qualities~ whatever
they may be, as are inseparable .from the
profession or occupation of public teaching. II)
Many modern critics have followed
regard.

Grote~

lead in the

Thus Theodor Gomper.rsays:
We may be asked, what was the genuine
common factor in the several sophists?
And to that question we can but reply
that it consisted merely of their
teaching profession and the conditions
of its practise imposed by the· age in
which they lived. For the rest, they
were united, as other people were
united, too, by the part they took in
the intellectual movements of their
times. It is illegitimate, if not
absurd, to speak of a sophistic mind,
sophistic morality, sophistic skepticism,
and so forth. 12}

Certainly, it is no longer possible, in the face of the
evidence given by such men, to speak of the sophists as a
tightly knit intellectual and educational group, consciously
holding common doctrines and adopting uniform methods.

Nor

is the acceptance of such an opinion at all necessary for the
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purpose of this inquiry-.

On the contrary• we may almost

accept Grote's position• and need only be carefUl to avoid
extreme conclusions which might be deduced from it.

For it

does not follow from what Grote has said that there was no
culture; no general spirit in education 1n fifth centu17
Athens for which the Sophists. though not consciously acting
as a school and most certainly characterized by strong individual differences 1n doctrines and methods• were responsible.

Impartial histocy oertaizll7 teaches us that there was

such a culture and spirit.

Zeller states this position

de:f'initely:
Although the men whom we are accustomed
to reckon as Sophists are not united by
any common doctrines recognized by them
all• there is a certain similarity o:f'
character among them which is unmistakable, and this pecularity shows itself
not merely in their coming forth as
teachers, but 1n their whole attitude
towards the science of their epoch• 1n
their repudiation of physical• and generally speaking•' 1n all merely theoretical enquiry, in the Skepticism explicitly avowed by the majority, and
the most important of the Sophists; in
the art of disputation. which most of
them are said to have taught and
practised, in the formal• techaica1
treatment o:f' rhetoric, 1n the free
criticism and naturalistic e~lanation
of the belief in gods, in the opinions
concerning right and custom, the seeds
of which were sown by the skepticism
of Protagoras and Gorgiasl though these
opinions only appear 1n a definite for.m
at a subsequent period. Though all
these traits may not be discoverable 1n
all the Sophists• yet some of them are
to be found in each case; and they all

~------------------------------------~
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lie so much in one direction- that
while we cannot overlook the individual
differences among these men, we are
nevertheless justified in regarding
them collectively as the representatives of the same for.m of culture. 13)
It is the cul~re and its representatives whom Aristophanes
attacks in the Clouds. 14)
Before filling in the details of the picture from
ancient testimony, it will be well to draw from impartial
history- the rough outline of the origin and development of
the so-called sophistic movement.

This may seem to prejudgee

the case; since from this very history, I believe_. :much of
Aristophanes' criticism will be corroborated.
outline is necessary for

~tsagenO:cf

Yet such an

clarity; and if only such

history as is generally agreed upon by reasonably impartial
historians is used, the danger of prejudice is small.
Broadly speaking there were two causes of the origin of
the Sophist movement:

the need, brought about by the political

and economic changes in fifth century Athena, of a new type of
education; and the crisis which philosophY' had reached at the
time.
This first cause was discussed briefly at the beginning
of the first chapter, and it was shown there that during the
(

half century immediately succeeding the Persian wars the most
characteristic note of Athens was rapid growth.

The city was

extending its political jurisdiction and quickly becoming an
empire.

It was developing into the world's center of art and
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letters.

Its economic life was growing daily mora complex.

courts and assembly were frequented.
abundance.

The

Wealth came to the city in

Coupled with all this was the transformation of the

torms of governement.

Traditional institutions withered, while

new ideas of equality bloomed, and democracy was in flower.

In

other spheres, too, the validity of traditional conventions and
laws was called into question.

The Athenian was growing sophis-

ticated, and it was a part of his sophistication to look with
skeptical eye upon rules and customs observed by the common herd.
Needless to

say,t~e~~mon

did not escape the skeptical quiz-

zings of the new sophisticates.

15)

But perhaps the most important result of this abnormally
rapid change was the transformation of the intellectual outlook
of the Athenian.

Previously interested primarily in the cosmos

and in the direction and preservation of the state, he now turned his inquiries inward to himself.

He became ego-centric,

interested in self-development, inquisitive about the nature and
validity of his own faculti$s, curious of ethical matters.

More-

over, he began to apply to his own conduct the principles underlying the policy of aggrandizement which the State was pursuing.
From this change of intellectual attitude we may take our
start 1n the consideration of the secon4 cause of the origin of
the Sophists - the Philosophical crisis.

Men whose thbught was

becoming egocentric were naturally dissatisfied with a philosoph'
engaged chiefly in trying to solve the riddles of the universe.
~hilosophy,

if it was to be saved at all, had to

be~in

to study
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and moral relations.

Furthermore. philosophy' at the time

was in a blind alley and filled with those contradictions so apt
to create skepticism.

Confused thought• as always• brought

contempt of thought.

T.he general tendency was to go one step

farther 1n the direction of the Eleatics and Heraclitus and
inquire into the nature and validity not only of the sense
faculty but of the intellect as well. .And the suspicion was
harbored that the results of this inquiry would ultimately
prove fatal to metaphysics.
tangle into Which

philosop~

possibilitY' of acquiring any

It was not too hard. after the
had involved itselfl to doubt the
D:ttti.~.

From this we see something of what the character of any
successfUl education at such a time would have to be.
the old education had been somewhat

haphazard~

Whereas

leaving most of

the advanced instruction to home and chance• the new training
would have to provide a systematic higher education.

It would

have to provide knowledge about a vast number ot practical
sciences.

It would be likely to stress civic virtue and to

teach men how to live successfully rather than to know for the
sake of knowing.

In other words it would have to give youths

a systematic preparation tor successful participation in the
complex life of the Athens of the day.

And this preparation

would have to be conditioned by the ideals prevalent at the
time.

In so tar as the education had aD-7 underlying

this phUosophy' would have to

be~ 1n

philosophy'~

tendenc:r at least·; sub-
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jective and ultimately skeptical.
The outline which impartial historians draw of the
sophist

movement~

shows the movement to be the legitimate

educational offspring of its age.

In drawing this outline, I

Sba1l use chiefly Henr,y Jackson's account of' the Sophists 1n the
Encyclopaedia Brittanica.
Jackson aptl7 distinguishes four principal types of
sophistries, a division which seems to be based on Plato's
several definitions of' the term Sophist 1n his dialogue of' that
name.

culture~

The four varieties are: that of'

politics~

and of' eristic.

of rhetoric, of

He says further:

turn:;

Each of these predominated 1n its
though not
to the exclusion of the others~ the sophistry of
aulture beginning abqut 447 and leading to ~e
soPQ1str,y of' er1stic~ and tbe soPbistr.y of' rhetoric
taking root 1n central Greece about 427 and merging
into the sophistey of politics. It)
Protagoras was the leading representative of' the
sophistr7 of culture.

Relinquishing the search for lm.owledge;

he professed rather to

tea~

civic excellence.
\

To

,. . ,
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virtue and to impart a kind of'

Plato has him sa7:
1

\

~~

~

~ ot
J

OL

k

.-..

E..\~, Vl

I~

f' 4,

,.......
U

......,
\

r:r 7,

--'
I
~ u .,o u ;t , ~ 7( £

f (1._

v
J\ ·

o TTw_s

Jl

o<V

.J v /
Olf\ lt?V

o<fUr(O(

r'

...-.

(

1f FC>(

T

\

o to (l(ol

I

tro.A.£.ws

T\\s
tXl

£

e1

1

~

\"'\

"'n

L-L wvJ

TIII.V cxvTo
\WV

e

)\a.L

\

11Cfl

I)

Jl

dVV"'<TW/ccTos 0<'1/
1<' \

T £lv

"a.

L

\
/
{\ £

y£

(

v.

And he agrees when Socrates says:
Oo){£.LS

'(c[f

~~L ,\/yuv T-0v TfoA,Tik~v'

e

/
\
e
""
T£XVit 1/ Ka.L ()1f l o-)(VHIJ 0((.
J
\
I
7\
ea<: y 0<.. 6 o v _s 7T o A t -r Or(. .s .
I '7,;

~

1ToL£.tv'

.t:><vo
;:// ptt.s
JI"

35

Protagoras' education was a literary education, and his
chief instruction grammar, style, poetry, and oratory.

Prod~s

also taught the sophistry of culture, much after the manner of
Protagoras except that he emphasized ethics more.
The field of learning dealt with by Protagoras and

Prod~s

was gradually extended until the polymath Hippias· claimed all
knowledge as domain.

From him sprang the eristic Sophists, who

professed not to know or communicate all branches of learning
but, as Jackson says, to provide "An aptitude for dealing with
all subjects which would make the knowledge of any subject
superfluous."

This aptitude was skill in disputation.

Now there

can be no doubt that this eristic sophistry quickly fell into
the abuse to which it is so liable - the abuse of stressing skUU
in debate and success in argument with little or no regard for
truth.
Meanwhile Gorgias, who called himself a

t. I

fYl I()) f

that sophistry of rhetoric which was to teach men to

introduced
sp~ak

eloquently and therefore to meet the need for accomplishment in
this art, which, as we have seen, the popularity of the law
court and assembly created in Athens.

This sophistry led to

that of politics, which taught the Athenian youth to understand
the riow rather complicated Athenian Constitution, to discuss
constitutional principles, and to consider questions of policy.
Such in brief outline is the history of the Sophist momement in Athens.

It is unnecessary to point out that from this

~--------------------------------------~
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very outline some of Aristophanes' criticism is corroborated.
In the succeeding chapter the details of the picture will be
filled in from contemporary and

~-contemporary

testimony.
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Notes on Chapter II
1. Ap. Diog. I, 12.
P. 430 N.l.
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Ap. Aristid• 46. Cfe Dielsl Fragm.ente. Section C, Altere
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4.

There is not universal agreement regarding Plato's respon-

Ct. Zellerl Historz of Greek P.hilOSOPAl• P.430 N.l.

sibility 1n this matter.

Grote holds that it was Plato's

genius which stamped the term with its bad sense:
Now though the appearance of a man so very- original as Socrates was a new fact of unspeakable
importance, the appearance of the Sophists
was no new fact; what was new was the peculiar
use of an old word, which Plato took out of
its usual meaning and fastened upon the emi.;.
nent paid teachers of the Socratic age. ..
- History 2£ Greece. Vol. a; Ch. 57·~ Pe355
Bury takes a middle position:
As applied to the teachers who educated the
,-ouths who were able to pay, the name acquired
a slightly unfavorable colour - partly owing
to the distru.st felt b7 the masses toward men
who lmow too :mu.oh1 partly to the prejudice
which in Greece a~ways existed more or less
against those who gave their services for P~···
Bu. t this haze of contempt which bung about the
sophistic protession,did not imply the idea
that the professors were impostors, who deliberately tried to hoodwink the public by
arguments in which the7 did not believe
themselves. That suggestion - which has determined the modern meaning of "sophist" and
"ahphistry" - was first made by the philosopher
Plato apd is entirely unhistorical. - Histo£72£ Greece. P. 387
Jowett, contending Chiefl7 against Grote; arrives at an
opinion somewhat like Bur,-•s:
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The use of the term "Sophist" 1n the dialogues
of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not
affixed by his genius, but already current.
When Protagoras ·says, "I confess that I am a
Sophist," he implies that he professes an art
denote.d by an abnoxious term; or when the 'Y'O'Ull8
Hippocrates, with a blush upon his face whiCh
is just seen b7 the light of dawn' admits that
he is going to be made a "Sophist, these words
would loose their point unless the term had
been already discredited. There is nothing
suprising 1n the Sophists' having an evil name;
that whether deserved or not was the natural
consequence of the 1r vacation. 1hat they were
forei~rs~ that the7 taught novelties, that
the7 excited the minds of youths are quite
sufficient reasons· to account for the approbrium which attaolldd to them. The genius of
Plato could not have stamped the word anew;
or have imparted the associations which occur
in contempor8.17 writers, such as Xenophan and
!socrates. Changes in meanings of words can /
on.l.7 be made with great difficulty and not
unless the7 are supported b'y a strong current
of popular feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may have extended
and envenomed the meaning, or that he -.,.have
done the Sophists the same kind of disservice
with 'oaterit7 which P~scal did to the Jesuits.
·But the bad sense of the word is not and could
not have been invented by him, and is found 1n
the early- dialogues, - e.g. the Protagoras, as well as 1n the later.
- Dialogues 2!_ Plato, V.3.
Introduction to th~ SoRhist, P. 428
We can not settle this matter here. This much is certain.
The name Sophist, probabl7 accepted by Protagoras to designate his profession, was used 1n a restricted and unpleasant
sense at least from Plato's time on.

5• Ct. Relublic, 596D1 Cf. also the Symposium, 208 c. Even in
Plato he producer of all things !BCiliea a wonder:f'ul.
Sophist.
6. There is an interesting passage in Aristides in which he
remarks the general looseness with which the word was used.
(Aristid. 46 (II 40'7 Dinde) - Ct. Diels, Fragmente, Sect. c.~
Altere Sophistik, 79.

39

J

'Clouds,: l. 331

e.
9.

Clouds, 1. 361 (Bolm Translation) Cf. also Birds 1.692.
Birds, u. 1694-1701 (Bohn Translation) PhUippus was
apparently a disciple of Gorgias. In WHip~ 421 we hear of
a Philippus who is caJ.led s ropy(ou
c ie (Bohn) translates this "the son of Gorgias," but Merry thinks it most
likely means "the disciple of Gorgias."
This whole question is not without its difficulties. HOwever, I think that what we have positively stated is pretty
generally admitted. To assert more than this would involve
us 1n m8.llJ' difficulties and would probably mean opposing
for.midable authorities.One holding~ for example~ that
Aristophanes meant to attack all the Platonic Sophists and
onl7 these , besides having to wrestle with the problem of
Socrates I presence 1n the Clouds; might find some difficult7
in explaining 11. 96-7 of the Ciouds, where Strepsiades
attributes to the exponents
the new learning a doctrine
probably belonging to the Ionic philosophers. Moreover,
he would have an adversary in Grote, who insists on the
vagueness of the concept of sophist as it existed 1n the
mind of the fifth centur,r Athenian. Jowett, however,
opposes Grote in this (ct. his introduction to the Sophist).

or

We must note here, too; that Grote (ct. P.35!> of
the History of Greece . Vol. a, Chapter 67.) insists:' 1'he
appearance oTthe sop~sts was no new fact." I feel certain~
however, from a study of the explanation he gives of this
opinion that he would admit sufficient newness in the
appearance of the Sophists to justi:f7 our identification of
them 1n general with Aristophanes I representatives of the
new learn1ng. For he certainly admits that these men were
distinguished fltom the educators 1n older Athens by their
charging fees for instruction and by their extension of the.
range of instruction imparted. It should be added that
other authorities, such as Zeller, differ from Grote in
this matter.
However, one passage in Grote offers particular
difficultY'• In his first footnote on P• 363 (op. cit.,
Vol. a., Ch. 67) he says:
Ritter (p.582) and Brandis (p.5~1) quote ve1'7
unfairlY' the evidence of the Clouds of Aristophanes as establishing this cbirge (of making
the worse appear the better reason), and that
of corrupt teaching generallj, against the
sophists as a bo~. I f Aristophanes is a
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witness against anyone, he is a witness against
Socrates, who is the person singled out for
attack in the Clouds. But these men, not admitting Aristopli8iies as evidence against
Socrates whom he S2!! attack, nevertheless
quote him as evidence against men like Protagoras and Gorgias, whom he S2!!· B2! attack •.
~aving the question of Socrates for the time, what can be
said of Grote's statement that Aristophanes does not attack
Protagoras and Gorgias? I do not see how it can be admitted
and Grote gives no proof for it. Aristophanes makes it
clear that he is attacking laid professors who are the exponents of the popular new earning of the Athens of his
~.
The only men who answer this description are the
Platonic Sophists. Moreover,' 1n the Birds, as we have
mentioned, Aristopbanes speaks explici tl,- of Gorgias as one
of the knavish rs.JM who live by- their tongues. It is certainly evident that he is criticizing in the Clouds this
very knavish race of rhetoricians and eristic sophists. ·T.hat
for the most part ancient testimo~ represents the Platonic
sophists as answering Aristopbanes' description of the new
professors in other respects will be shown 1n the third
chapter of this discussion. Therefore, while it is difficult to show that Aristophanes meant to include this or that
individual Sophist 1n his censure, or that he did not include others not sophists, it seems impossible to show
that Gorgias or any other of the Platonic Sophists was
excluded.

11. Grote, Histo£Z £!Greece, Vol.

s,

ch. 67 1 P• 371.

12. Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, P• 415e
13. Zeller's Histor,r of Greek Philosopgr, P• 497
14. James Adams (The Religious Teachers of Greece · P• 284)

S1'mmarizes the poliits of agreement oTthe sopMsts as
follows:

1.tt ma7 be safel)" affirmed, I think~· that
the sophists agreed for the most part 1n
refasing blindl7 to acquiesce 1n the traditional principles of Greek morality~
politics, and religion. A certain degree
of rationalism is characteristic of the.m
all. In the sphere of religionI it manifests its~lf sometimes as agnosticism,
sometimesi as in the case of Prodicus, for
example, as virtual Atheism; in the sphere
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of politics and ethics, it appears either in the
shape of an individualism so extreme as to
strike at the foundations of society; or in
the form of the not less anti-social doctrine
that l!ight is Right 1 or else it invoiuntarily tends
to substitute for the old conception of the city•
state the dream not merely of a Panhellenic but
of a universal commonwealth.
Rev.

w. Incas Collins (Aristophanes,

P• 76) has this to say:

The term 'Sophist,• though in its wider sense

it was applied to professors of Philosophy
generally, had come to mean in the popular
language of Athens, those who· for pay~ undertook to teach a method of rhetoric and argument by which a man might prove anything
whatever. It is against these popular lecturer,;
who either taught or were commonly believed to
teach this perversion of the great science of
dialectics~ that Aristophanes brings the whole
weight of his biting humor to bear in the Clouds.
15. One might note here that while the way had been paved for
religious skepticism by Xenophanes and by the materialism
of many physical philosophers, it had not enjoyed much
popular favor before.
'

16. "The Sophists" (Article by Henry Jackson in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica~ Vol. 20 1 14th Edition 1929)
17.

Protagoras~

318 E.
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CHAPTER III
Ancient Testtmosr Concern;pg

~

Sophists

· A word or two of explanation must preface this chapter
on ancient testimony concerning the Sophists.

Not all of the

testimony is from contemporaries of Aristophanes, but the
evidence of later ancient authors is considered valuable here
when these writers lived near the time of the Sophist movement
and drew their information from the Sophists• contemporaries.
Again some of the testimony deals with Sophists who lived after
Aristophanes' day; but this is important because these later
Sophists were a part of the movement and carried on; at least
to a large extent, in the spirit in which the movement was
begun.

Indeed, they often reduced Sophistic principles to the

logical and ruinous conclusions from which the early leaders
had shrunk and which Aristophanes appears to have feared so
greatq.

Finally the witness of these authors sometimes deals

with a single Sophist, and the ideals and practise of this
individual Sophist may be found to be contradicted in another.
Yet if this individual was an important unit in the movement;
the testimony- concerning him is ot importance, tor his teachings had great influence in forming that elusive and often
self-contradicting spirit of the new learning.
Plato's

testimo~

will• of

course~

be the most frequently

used, tor his criticism of the Soph1sts was most complete.
How impartial and objective that criticism was, it is not the
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business of this 1nqu1ey to investigate.
Plato was the
superficial~

ene~

This much is certain:

of the Sophists because he felt they were

teaching merely externals based on no adequate

metaphysics.
In reviewing the testimony of the ancients, this dis-

cussion will treat 1n order those points which•' as we saw in
the first chapter; for.med the substance of Aristophanest
attack; -

namely~

rhetoric~

religious skepticism6 polymathJ, the charging of

humorous description, ethics; eristic;

fees for 1nst:ruction.

li\lrther treatment of the effects of

sophistic education will be left to a later chapter, for 1n
this particular matter the point of interest is not whether
Aristophanes' belief that sophistry would work ill in Athens
was shared by_ his contemporaries but whether the ed:uca tion
did actually do har.m.
With regard to Ar1stophsnes' humorous description one·
can scarcel,- expect to find mu.ch to corroborate his testimony
1n the works of contemporaries.

Much of tbis description of

"pale-faced vagabonds," bare-footed and frugal-living knaves,
etc., is evidentl7 used to evoke a laugh and with little intention of precise picturization.

Much of it is applicable

perhaps to Socrates, the principal. character of the pla7•

In-

deed, the dialogue between Antipholli and Socrates, found 1n
Xenophon• indicates that to Antiphon, at least, Aristophanes'
description of the Sophists as frugal and ascetic hardly
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applies.

For Antiphon criticizes Socrates for living so

frugally, while Socrates replies:
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However, in as much as Aristophanes describes his
Sophists as a rather poppous lot; there is corroboration of
his testimollJ' in Plato_- who throughout uses his pleasantly
satirical humor to paint the vanity of the Sophists.

Thus he

makes Socrates say:
As I suspected that he (Protagoras) would
like to have a little display and glor,y in
the presence of Prodius and Hippias. 2)
This is most evident; too, in his well known characterization
of T.hrasymachus 1n the ReusbliQ.

The point is not sufficiently

important to warrant further treatment and quotations.
It has been shown that Aristophanes condemned the
Sophist ethics because of their contempt for justice and their
separation of law from nat*re.

There is little difficulty in

corroborating this criticism by the testtmony of ancient
authors.

However, it must be remembered in this consideration

that these ethical principles· which Aristopbanes reprehended Wf'f"e
'fl.fienc)ilt>ttn taught explicitly by the greater Sophists, but

these Sophists did teaCh doctrines which, when reduced to their
logical conclusions by lesser Sophists and the common
became such ethics.

people~

It is also to be remembered - and Jackson

suggests that Grote may not have adverted sufficiently to
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this

3) - that one may sponsor revolting ethical doctrines

and yet live an apparently irreproachable life.

FUrtner, it

must be noted that the existence of a sophistic Spirit which
embraced such unconventional ethics is not destroyed by the
!'act that one or two individual Sophists taught conventional
morals.
It will be useful both for the study of Sophistic ethics
and of sophistic eristic to consider what epistemological
principles were embraced by the Sophists, for these principles
were a base on which tbe rest was built, if not always by the
Sophists who popularized the epistemology, at least with
unfailing logic by their disciples.
Of paramount importance in this matter is the testimony
of the ancients, particularly Plato, concerning Protagoras•
theory of knowledge.

Diogenes Laertius

4)

tells us that

Protagoras "used to say that nothing else was soul except the
senses ••• and that everything was true."

He refers to Plato's

Theaetetus as his authority - though. possibly 1ncorrectl7 with
regard to the first part.

5)

We need not enter upon a com-

plete discussion of Plato's development of Protagoras' subjective and relativistic theory of cognition given 1n the
Theaetetus.

Suffice it to say that he began, according to

Jtla to 1 from the Heracle i tan principle that "all is flux,·" and

proceeding to the proposition that all knowledge is sense
perception, he concluded that things are for each man as they
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appear to him.

This is the sense in which Plato understood

Protagoras' fwmous dictum:
Man is the measure of all things, of
the existence of things that they are~
and of the non-existence of things
that they are not. 6)
Plato r s interpretation of this dictum as meaning, as he
says in the cretzlus~ 385 E and 386, that
'.7
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was, to the best of my knowledge, the one commonly accepted
among the ancients, and I see no reason for doubting it. 7)
Whether Protagoras ever reduced his epistemology to its
logical conclusions in ethics is difficult to lear.n.

T.he

statement which Plato puts in his mouth, that:
Whatever appears to be just and fair
to a state, while sanctioned by a state~
is just and fair to it; but the teacher
of wisdom causes the good to tab the
place of evil both in appearance and
reality, 8)
is hard to interpret and may be an exaggeration.

On the other

hand this Sophist is represented in the Protagoras as holding
some ethical principles which would delight the most rigid of
conventional moralists •. He says that virtue is the most
beautiful of all things and professes himself to be a teacher
of it.

9)

T.he famous myth which Plato puts in the mouth of

Protagoras, 10)

represents Zeus as giving to all men, through
I

Hermes, a share in~\ k'Y\ and

-' I
ex Ldws

since unless all, or the

majority, possessed these, no city could be formed.

Just what
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relation Protagoras believed to exist between law and nature

.I find it difficult to determine from ancient

testimo~~

but

Plato clearly represents him as holding that civic virtue; of
which justice is a part, is of paramount importance for man.
Of very suspicious character,

however~

is Protagoras' boast

that he can make the weaker argument appear the stronger.

But

this must be considered more in detail when the sophistic
eristic is treated.
\~tever

11)

may have been the distance to which P.rotagoras

followed his epistemological premises to their conclusions in
the field of ethics, and however irreproachable may have been
his own private morals, judged in the light of conventional
standards~

it is surely clear that such an epistemology must be

logically destructivo of ethdes.

If there is no objective and

universally valid truth, neither can there be any objective and
universal moral standard, and right and wrong, as well as all
other things, must be measured subjectively by man.

Hence,

justice becomes purely subjective and any absolute and
universally binding lavr is contrary to nature.

We shall see

that, according to ancient testimony, these conclusions were
drawn by some Sophists •
Similar to the case of Protagoras is that of Gorgias.
One would surely hesitate to impute a bad personal morality to
this Sophist.

On the contrary he seems to have had a reputatioi

for temperance and is quoted as attributing his long life to
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the fact that he had "never done an,..t.h1ng for the sake of
pleasure."

l~J

True~

Plutarch attributes a principle to him

which isl to say the least, of suspicious character:
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However; the picture of him painted by Plato 1n the Gorgias
shows him to hold generally good ethical doctrines •
From the Me no it is learned that Gorgias 1 unlike
Protagorasl never professed to teach virtue:
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Yet though it cannot be shown that Gorgias' own ethics
were

base~

it must be admitted that his epistemological tenets;

as we know them through the ancients, were destructive of
morals.

While Protagoras was a relativist holding that all

__

things are relatively true, Gorgias was a nihilist and taught
tha. t nothing is true.

In his treatise on the -.-.,;;;,;;;;;;...;;.
Nature of the

Non-existent he is said to have enuntiated three propositions:
1i) that nothing is; 2) if anything is, it is unknowable to man~·

3) if anything is knowable, the knowledge of it cannot be
communicated to another.

15)

T.his position is also attributed

to Gorgias in the Pseude-Aristotle•s f! Gorgia, chapter

5~

and

the sgme doctrine is obviously referred to by Isocrates when
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he says:

The ethical implications of such a nihilism are no less dear
than those of Protagoras' subjectivism.
morality~

troyed• justice,

Once truth is des-

natural law must also vanish.
writers~

What is lmown; f'rom aneient

of the epistemo-

logical doctrines of other Sophists is sufficient to
least~

show~

at

that the general tendency of these men was toward a
would~·

skepticism, which

if' logically developed, result in the

destruction of morals. Sextus describes Xeniades thus: /
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This same Euthydemus, in the dialogue bearing his name; is
represented as holding that it is possible neither to spealc
nor think .falsely, since one cannot say or think what is not.
Cretylus, in the dialogue of his

n~1e 1

also accepts this

19)

doctrine, that no one can speak a falsehood, which Plato says/
held both o.f old and at his time •
general Plato ascribes the

s~e

20) To the Sophist in

tenet:

many
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A consideration of contemporary and near contemporary
testimony regarding the actual ethical teachings of many
Sophists will represent these Sophists as drawing the logical
conclusions from the sophistic epistemological principles and
will, I believe, confirm Aristophanes 1 criticism. Some Sophists, of course, rather inconsistently, accepted many fine
ethical principles.

We have seen that this was true of Pro-

tagoras and Gorg ias, am Prodicus may be added to the list. In
his "Choice of Heracles " 22) this Sophist upholds the traditional morality, praises happiness and virtue, and places
these in sharp contrast to a life given over to pleasure.

The

picture drawn of other Sophists is consi. derably different.
Aristophales, as we saw, criticized the Sophists for
divorcing law and justice from nature.

In considering quo-

tations from aneient authors in this regard, caution must be
observed.

In speaking of law a Sophist may, of course, be

referring to positive law, and such legistlation can, obviously,
be separated from and contrary to nature. Now Antiphon did
actually distinguish between law which is mere convention and
that which is according to nature. 23) However, even Vhen
~1is

distinction between natural and positive law was made, I

doubt that it was clearly understood, and I think very few laws
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were considered natural.

Thus. Hippias admitted divine un-

written laws, but only those which are everywhere observed. 24)
Further, it seems that there was little realization of
the foundation for positive law in the natural law.

T.bus,

Antiphon held it a sin to transgress the law which is according
to nature, but thought it no evil to transgress the law which
was convention unless one was caught,· because to sin against
the former was to sin against truth, but to transgress the
w~s

latter

a sin against opinion.

25)

Consequently, Hippias statement is at least suspicious:
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Xenophon represents this same Hippias as asking:
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Platots picture of the followers of Protagoras is clear
enough:
But 1n the other case; I mean when they
speak of justice and injustice, piety and
impiety, they are confident that these
have no natural or essential basis. The
truth is that which is agreed upon at the
ttme of agreement and as long as the
agreement lasts.
He adds: "And this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras."

28}

Aristotle's statement indicates that the tendency to
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separate justice from nature was prevalent:
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T.hen there is an extremely important section in Plato's
Laws, which is surely to be understood as an exposition of
Sophist doctrine.

30)

T.he section readst

Ath: And they say- that politics cooperate
with nature, but 1n a less degree~
and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art;
and is based on assumptions which
are not true.
Ole: How do you mean?
Ath: In the first place rrry dear friend,
they would say that the gods exist
neither by nature or by art~ but
only by the laws of states, which
are different infiitferent places~
according to the agreement of those
who make them; and that the honorab le is one thing by nature and
another thing by law, and that the
principles of justice have no existence at all 1n nature, but that
mankind are always disputing about
them and al taring them; and that
the alterations which are made by
art an4 by law have no basis in
nature, but are of authority for
the moment and at the time at
which they are made •
a t)
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The light in which Plato represents Sophistic ethics in
the Gorgias is well known.

To be sure, Gorgias himself is not

shown to hold bad moral pr1nc1ples 1 but Polus, who takes up the
argument where Gorgias leaves off; boldly enuntiates more
questionable doctrines.

He does not hesitate to maintain that

Archilaus, unjust usurper of Macedonia's throne, is among the
happiest of men.

32)

Callicles, final opponent of

Socrates~

fearlessly insists that it is better to do wrong than to
sutter.

33)

He continues to say that "tor the most part

custom (v/t'v~) and nature are generally at variance with one
another~"

'i

34)

since, for examplei

By the rule of nature that only is
more disgraceful which is the greater
evil-as~ tor example 1' to suffer in~
justiceJ but by the rule of custom,
to do evil is the more disgracetu.l. 3'1")
In the same paJJBage he affirms:
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His reference to the common practise among animals with regard
this matter is reminiscent of the passage 1n the Clouds, in
which Pheidippides~ about to beat his father; defends his
action by an appeal to the common practise among cocks.
Apparently not all the ethical vagaries of modern evolutionists
are original with them.
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Fina~~y,

reference must be made, 1n connection with

sophistic ethics, to the teaching of
it from the Republic.

This Sophist

Th~s~s

ope~y

as we know

states that:

For injustice is censured because the
censurers are afraid of suffering, and
not from any fear they have of doing
injusticeJ
( a..'l"ld further)
Justice is the interest of the stronger
whereas injustice is a man's own profit
and interest. 3'fj
Such is the pictu.re, by ancient writers, of the ethical
princip~es

embodied in sophistic culture.

It is

sure~y

evident that this picture is nearly a perfect replica of
Aristophanes' painting.
As has been shown, Aristophanes found fault with the
Sophists because of their eristic which emphasized victory 1n
argument to the detriment of truth, and even boasted of making
the wrong side appear right.

There is little difficulty in

verifying this criticism in the testimony of the ancients.
For the most part, it is true this eristic was taught
and practised by lesser Sophists, though not all the greater
men of this group were above it.

Certainly the foundation on

which it was built was in the teaching of the greater Sophists.
For when the existence of objective truth has been denied,
there is little reason to concern oneself with right and wrong
in a debate, and it is but logical to use every device to give

the appearance of truth to Whatever one wishes to prove.

,.
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From Diogenes Laertius we learn that Protagoras did
apply his theory of knowledge to the principles of debate:
He was the first person who asserted
in every question there were two sides
to the argument exactly opposite to one
another.
38)
In the same work Diogenes corroborate's in Protagoras' case

Aristophanes 1 charge of "quibbler' against the Sophists.
He was also the first person who gave
a precise definition of the parts of
time;: and who explained the value of
opportunity# and who instituted contests of argument# and who armed the
disputant~ with the weapon of sophism.
He it was; too# who first left facts
out of consideration# and fastened
his arguments on words# and who was
the parent of the present superficial
and futil~inds of discussion. On
which account Timon says of Hlm:Protagorasl that slippery
arguer# in disputatious contests
fully skilled.
39)
Diogenes says also of Protagoras:
He first employed the reasonings of Aristophanes which attempt to establiSh the point
that they cannot be contradicted; as Plato
tells us in the Eu~mus. 40)
Likewise Clement of Alexandria, in the Stromata, tells
us:

Seneca says:
Protagoras ait de omn1 re in utramque
partem disputani posse ex aequo et de hac
ipsa, an omnia res in utramque partem
dis utabili sit
42
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Finally; Aristotle speaks with some disgust of Protagorast
This sort of argument illustrates what
is meant by making the worse argument
appear the better. Hence. people were
right in rejecting the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was
a fraud; the probability it handled
was not genuine but spurious 6 and has
a place 1n no art except rhetoric and
eristice 43)
Plato, speaking of the Sophist 1n general, 44) says
that 'he is a disputer" and a "teacher of the art of disputation
to

others~"

and he adds that the art of disputation is the art

of disputing about all things.

Plato then shows that since

the Sophist can not really know all things, he must have only
apparent knowledge of them.
Isoorates is evidently referring to the eristio Sophists
when he says:
Indeed, who can fail to abhor~ yes, to
contemn those teachers in the first place
who devote themselves to disputation,·"
since they pretendto search for truth•
but straightway at the beginning of
their professions attempt to deveive us
with lies. 45)
And in the

s~e

speech he refers to these disputers as

"expounding oaptiouattheories."

46)

In his EuthySemu.,s Plato subjects the eristio of the

Sophists to a riotous satire, using, Euthydemus and
Dio~sodorus

disputation.
inevitable."

as the chief representatives of this kind of
Dionysodorus boasts that "all our questions are
47)

He and Euthydemus delight in tying Cleinas
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in knots.

'l'hey ask him a question -e.g., "Are those who learn

the wise or the ignorant?u

48)

- and then, taking the

opposite side from that which Cleinas defends, use clever arguments to trip him up, to the great glee and admiration of their
followers.
Likewise, the wor11::. of Aristotle, De Sophistici.S. Elenchis,
describes the practises of the eristic Sophists.

It shows at

length the many devices used by these Sophists to ensnare their
opponents in debate, and the method leaves no doubt that victory
and not the disclosure of truth is their object.

One trick, to

which Aristophanes refers :) in the De Sophisticis Elenchis, is
that of availing oneself of the ambiguity of language • 49)
Equivocal words were used as middle terms .as middle terms in
syllogisms; for example:.
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Thus, Aristotle says in his Rhetoric:
Words of ambiguous meanmng are chiefly
useful to enable the Sophist to mislead his hearers.
51)
Ancient writers thus describe the Sophist eristic, a
method of debate scarcely reconciliable with a regard for
objective truth, and a practise likely to work serious moral
harm.
Closely allied to the eristic of the Sophists was the
rhetoric which their education included.

Now there is no

difficulty in producing ancient testimony to verify Aristophanes
re resentation of the So hists as rhetoricians

r
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one denies that they were such and that they emphasized rhetoric
in their training.

It is more important to determine whether or

not in the eyes of other ancient authors
prehensible.

thi~

rhetoric was re-

For Aristophanes apparently felt that the sophis-

tic rhetoric was worthy of ridicule, since it was an overemphasis of external form to the detriment of content,

pe~1aps

another means of achieving the same end as eristic.

but

Let us con-

sider what the ancients had to say of this rhetoric.
The most e1ninent rhetorician among the Sophists was Undoubtedly Gorgias, and the influence he exercised on future
rhetoric, especially through his pupil Isocrates, is well known,
yet if ancient testimony is to be believed, he did overemphasize
external form in speech.
In the Gorgias (456 A sq.) Plato has this Sophist give an
encomium of rhetoric and admit as true Socrates' ironic remark
that the greatness of rhetoric seems to be something supernatural.

Similarly, in the Philebus Protagoras says:
I often heard Gorgias maintain that
the art of persuasion far surpassed
everything else ••••••.• to this all
things submit not by compulsion but
by their own free will. 52)

Plato also suggests that Gorgias was not too concerned about the
content of speeches, since this Sophist and Tisias:
Are not ignorant that probability is superior
to truth, and who by force of argument make
the little appear great and the great little,
and the new old and the old new, and have
discovered universal forms, either short or
going on to infinity. ~3)
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The ancients likewise

~~marked

his attention to the ex-

tarnal forms of speech. Aristotle says: /
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And Diony.

Diodorus (ap. Diels Fragmente, Sect. P. 82 A4 ) tells us that
Gorgias, when he came to Athens, startled the people with ~is
sp~ech

because of its symmetry, antithesis, in general, its

form.

Finally, for an example of excessive use of the adorn-

ments of language, one might refer to Agathon's speech (Plato's
Symposium 194rE) which Socrates says (198 0) reminds him very
much of Gorgias.
Plato gives an imitation of Protagoras' rhetoric in the
famous myth of the Protagoras (320 0 sq.).

The reader had best

judge this for himself.
In the case of the imitation given by Plato (frotagoras_
337 0)

of Hippias speech, there can be little room for a doubt-

fUl judgement.

It is a rambling speech, without much thought,

and full of unnecessary words.
Thrasymachus appears to have laid considerable stress on
form.

Dionysius

I'

,.
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According to Plato:
For the 'sorrows of a poor old man', or any
other pathetic case, no one is better than
the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole
company of people into a passion and out of
one again by his mighty magic, and is first
rate at inventing or disposing of any sort
of calumny on any grounds or none.
57)
Evidently, he gave rules for oratorical for.m, for Suidas says
of him:
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Critias also laid down rhetorical precepts.

Phrynichus

says of him:

In the Phaedrus Plato, after his ironic praise of various
Sophist rhetoricians (267 a sq.) - e.g. of "Evenus who invented
correct allusion and indirect praises," of Gorgias, of Prodicus
who "said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech,
that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of
reasonable length," of Hippias, of Polus "and his shrines of
learned speech such as disputation and figurativeness," of
Protagoras and Thrasymachus, - after this irony he censures
these men for emphasizing merely the outer form of rhetoric.
Socrates says:
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And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles
heard of these wonderfUl arts, brachylogies
and eikonologies and all the hard names
which we have been endeavoring to draw into
the light of day, what would they say?
Instead of losing temper and applying
uncompl~entary epithets, as you and I have been
doing to the authors of such imaginary art,
·their superior wisdom would rather censure
us, as well as them. Have a little
patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would
say, and don't be angry with those who from
some want of dialectical skill are unable
to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the
art in the preliminary conditions of the
art, and when they have taught these to
others, fancy that they have been teaching
the whole art of rhetoric; but as to persuasion in detail and unity of composition,
that they regard as an easy thing with which
their disciples may supply themselves. 60)
Plato makes another remark which is of interest to this
discussion.

After stating in the Phaedrus (269 D) that "the art

of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias and
Thrasymachus," he says a little later (271 A) that Thrasymachus
or any other who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric must base
his teaching on a sound psychology.
!socrates' criticisms of the old Sophists in his Antidosis
and of the later in his Contra Sophistas are well known.

He has

no use for the Sophists who profess to teach political discourse, for "they have no interest in truth," and fUrther:
They do not attribute any of this power
either to the practical experience or the
native ability of the student, but they
undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they wo~ld teach the
letters of the alphabet, not having taken
the trouble to examine into the nature of
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each kind of knowledge, but thinking that
because of the extravagance of their
promises they themselves will command
admiration and the teaching of discourse
will be held in higher esteem - oblivious
to the fact that the arts are made great
not by those who are without scruple in
boasting about them, but by those who are
able to discover all the resources which
each art affords.
61)
From this discussion of ancient testimony about the
rhetoric of the Sophist, it is clear that Aristophanes' representation and criticism of the Sophists in this regard was
corroborated.

The other ancients, also, considered the Sophists

as rhetoricians who made too much of external show and persuasion and thought too little of content and truth.
Amons the criticisms of the Sophists which Aristophanes
apparently considered serious was his censure of their
skepticism about traditional religion and their general tendency
to agnosticism or atheism.

Again, it must be noted that the

skeptical epistemology of the Sophists would naturally tend to
produce a religious skepticism.

There

~re

specific texts in the

ancient writers which indicate that such skepticism did actually
result.
Of course, the classic text in this matter is the fragment
from Protagoras' treatise

'~ ~ ~~

a fragment often quoted

and referred to in ancient writings:
Concerning the gods I am not able to know
to a certainty whether they exist or.
whether they do not. For there are many
things which prevent one from knowing,
especially the obscurity of the subject
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and the shortness of the life of man.
Cert~inly

62)

this is an open profession of agnosticism.

It is obvious that Gorgiast nihilism. logically .followed
out, would annihilate the gods.

If its milder hypotheses

were accepted, it• too, would result in

agnosticis~

To Critias, Sextus (Adv. Math. IX, 54 ap. Diels
FraSffiente, Sect.

c.

88 B 25) attributes the doctrine that the

gods were invented to provide protection against secret wrongdoing.

!!!•

Prodicus' teaching (SeJ11;.

~·

IX, 18; and Cioe ,!2!

Deorum 1, 37 1 1-18; and 151 38• - ap. Diels op. cit. B 5)

that the ancients accepted useful things, - e.g. the moon and
sun, - as gods has a suspicious ring.

Hermias (Z. Plat. Phaed.

p. 239 1 211 ap. Diels op. cit. 85 B 8.) says

'f.b.rasymach~

held that:

This last, of course, is not atheism or agnosticism, but is ot
the stuff of skepticism.
quoted above, (Ch.

3~

Then the passage in Plato's Laws

P• 13) is worth requoting 1n part here.

As was noted previously, the passage is certainly meant to
express Sophist teaching:
The gods exist neither by natu~ or by artl
but only by the laws of states. which are
different in different places, according to
the agreement of those who make them. 6~)
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Finally~

it should be remarked that not only sophistic

epistemology but also sophistic ethics demanded a break with
religion.

Just as no sound ethics can be built independently

of religion. so no unsound

ethics~

or lack of morals; can

brook religion.
Aristophanes' next and last two criticisms of the
do not seem so important to us as the others.

Sop~st

I refer to his

censure of the polymathy which the Sophists professed and to
his ridicule of their charging for instruction.
Of course • the most famous for the vast lmowledge to
which he laid claim is the Sophist Hippias. Philostratus says
of him:

he always offered

11

to perform any of the exhibitions which I

had prepared and to answer any questions which anyone had to
ask."

65}

and further: "I have never found anyone who was

my superior in anything. 11 66)

In the Hippias Major (285 b sq.)

Socrates runs through a rather formidable list of subjects on
which Hippias can speak.
that Hippia.s is : ·_.

In the lesser Hippias Socrates says

"~st

this by his own boast.

arts the wisest of mentt 67)

and

Socrates also remembers how Hippias

~I'

65
b~agged

that when he went to Olympia, everything on his

was his own

- -rv,

(Mem.

wo~k.

68)

Xenophon has

Soc~ates

pe~son

remark to Hippias

41 6):
\

'i)L>

Now I do not believe that the other great Sophists professed such a polymathy as Hippias, but I think it true that
they did embrace a rather large number of subjects in their
education.

According to Plato;

indeed~

Protagoras explicitly

denies teaching some of the subjects which Hippias taught,
but at the same time he says that the ordinary Sophists did
teach these subjects:
If Hippocrates comes to me, he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other
Sophists are in the habit of insulting their
pupils, who~ whep they have just escaped
from the arts 1 are taken back and driven into
them by these teachers~ and made to learn
calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and
music (he gave a look at Hippiaa as he said
this) ; but if he come a to me, he will learn
that which he comes to learn. And this is
prudence in affairs private as well as
public; he will learn to order his house in
t~est manner, and he will be best able to
speak and act in the affairs of the state. 69}
Diogenes Laertiua provides us with a list of the writings of
Protagoraa extant at his time, and the list surely includes
an amazing variety of subjects:
A. treatise on the Art of Contention; one

on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a
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Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues;
one one the Original Condition of man; one
on those in the Shades Below; one on the Things
which are not done properl7 by Men; one volume of Precepts; one essa7 entitled Justice
in Pleading for Hire, two books of Contradictions. 70)
Of Gorgias

Plato~

through Socrates says:

And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style~·
which becomes those who know~ and is the
style in whiCh he himself answers all
comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask
him anything. 71)
The same idea is found in the Gorgias 447

c.

Cicero~ speaking of Prodicus, says: Plurimum
tempor1bus illis etiam de natura rerum et
disserdlt et scripsit. 72)

I think it can be safely agreed that sophistic education
was much larger in scope thani:the older education whose place
it took.

It should be remembered, too; that sophistic rhetoric

and eristic was intended to equip the youth to deal with
practically any subject, even though he might not have much
lmowledge of the matter.
With regard to the fact of the Sophists' teaching for
pay, - Aristopbanes 1 last criticism, - there is such agreement
among all that it seems hardly necessary to cite authors in
the matter.

Protagoras is said to have introduced the practise ·

- a novel one to the Athenians and apparently a considerable
shock to some, - and the Sophists in general adopted it.
the notes I shall give several references where one can
if he wishes, the ancient testimony on the subject.

73}

In
read~

67

In the course of this discussion no effort has been made

to examine the possibilities of prejudice in the authors whose
testimony has been used.
inQliry.

74)

To do so is beyond the scope of this

Obviously, however, so long as the possibility

of prejudice has not been excluded, the value of the testimony
is considerably lessened.

Of course, as the mmber of authors

1n agreement on a matter is larger the liklihood of prejudice

and error is diminished, though not excluded.

From this

chapter, however, I believe it is clear that the testimony
of contemporary and near-contemporary ancient writers corroborates Aristopbanesr criticism of the Sophists.
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Notes on Chapter III
1. Memorabilia I, 6, 10.
2. Protagoras 317 c.
3. Henry Jackson, Article on Sophists, Encyclopaedia Brit., 14th
Edition.
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IX, 51 C. D. Yonge 1 s translation.
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6. Theaetetus 152 A. This dictum is often quoted and referred
to. Cf. Theaetetus 160 C.; Cr.tylus 385 E; Aristotle's
Metaphysics, X, 1 (1053 A 35) and XI, 6.; Sext. Math. VII,
60; etc.
7. Aristotle, I believe, interpreted the dictum as Plato did.
Cf. Metaphtsics XI, 1062 b. 13 sq. and IV, 1007 b 19 sq.
However, I mnot sure that Metaphysics X, 1053 a 36 sq. does
not state a different view. For other interpretations
similar to Plato's confer: Sext. Pyrrh. h. I 216 ff. (ap.
Diels, Fragmente, Section C, 74 A 14) (cf. also Diels, op.
cit., 74 A 19), and Democritus in Plutarch Adv. Col. 1108 f.
sq. {ap. Burnet, Greek Philosophy,Part I, p:-!16~
8. Theaetetus 167

e.

9. Protagoras 349 E.
10. Protagoras 320 0 sq.
11. It might be noted here, as a point of interest, that Protagoras in the dialogue of his name, 324 B, seems to know
merely the preventive function of punishment. However this
is not perfectly clear, and it is doubtful whether Platds
own notion of punishment was complete.
12. Athen. XII 548 CD (ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect.
My translation.)

c.,

82 A.,
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13. Plutarch, De Adul. et Am.
Sect. c, 82B"'2'()) - -

23 p. 64 c.(Ap. Dials, op. cit,

14. Meno, 95 C. Note, however, that Meno, who professed to share
Gorgias' opinions, is represented (Meno 71 E) as speaking
on virtue. He distinguiShed between the virtue of man and
that of woman.
15. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII 65 Sq. ( ap. Dials op. cit., Sect c.,
82 B3 ) Sextus-a!so gives Gorgias' proof for his position,
but this is not pertinent here.
16.jsocrates

10, 3 (Ap. Dials, op. cit., Sect. c., 82 B.)

17. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 53. (Ap. Dials op. cit., Sect. c,
cf. also-AntiPEQn Op. Dials. ap. cit., Sect. C, 87 B.
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18. Cratylus 386 D.
19. Euthydemus 283 E sq., 286

c,

etc.

20. Cratylus 429 D.
21. Sophist 260 D.
22. Xen. Memorabilia II, 21-!4
23. Dials, op. cit., Sect.

c.,

87 B 44

24. Xen. Mem. 4, 19.
25. Dies, op. cit., Sect. c., 87 B 44.
26. Protagoras 337 D.

28. Theaetetus

27. Xen. Mem. IV, 4, 14.

29. Aristotle

172 B.
De Soph. El.

c.

12, 173 a7

30. So Zeller (~. ~ q~eek ebll· p. 479 n •. 1) and Burnet
(G£§ek ~· Part I, p. 122) understand it.
31.

~

X, 889 D & E.

32. Gorgias, 470 D sq. Zeller (op. cit., p. 477 n. 1) correctly
observes that whether or not Callicles was a Sophist in the
Narrower sense is unimportant, for Plato surely means us tio
regard him as a representative of sophistic culture.
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33.

Gor~ias

482 E

34.

"

482 E

35.

II

483 a

36.

It

483 c, d.

37. Republic 344
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Jowett

38. Diogenes Laertius 11 Protagoras 11 From Lives and Opinions of.
Eminent Philosphers, translated by c. B. Yonge.
39. Ibidem.
40.
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41. Clem. Strom. VI, 65 ( ap. Diels op. cit., Sect.
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51. Rhetoric, 1404 b.

52. Philebus, 58 A & B
53.
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54. Rhetoric III, 1
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1404 a 25

55. Diony. De Vic Die. Dem. 963 ( ap. Zeller,
p. 493 n. 1}
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56. Isae. 20 (ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect.
57. Phaedlus 267

c,

85 A 13)

c.,

85 A 1)

c.

58. Luidas ( asp. Diels op. cit., Sect.
Rhet. III, 1, 1409 a

Aristotle's

59. Phrynich. Praepar. Soph. ( ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect.
88 A 20 )
60. Phaedrus
61.

Con~~

c.,

269 A sq.

Soph. 9 sq. (Norlin's translation)

62. Diog. Laert., "Protagoras 11 from Lives of .B.ln.inent Philosophers
IX, 51 {Yonge's Translation)
63. Laws, X 889 E.
64. Phil. V, Soph., I, 11, 1 sq. ( ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect.
86 A 2.)

c.,

65. Hipp. Min. 363 c. & D.
66. Hipp. Min. 364 A
67. Hipp. Min. 368 B
68. Ibid.
69. Prota!oras 318 D sq. Jowett
70. Diog. Laert.

op. cit., loc. cit.

71. Meno 70 B
72. Cic.

~ ~·

III, 32, 128.

ap. Diels, op. cit., 84 B 3
73. Diog. IX 52, ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A1 ; Philostr. v. soph. I
104. ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 2; Hesych. Onamatol. bei SChol
Plat. de Rep. 600 c, ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 3; Apul. Flor.
18 P., ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 4; Plato Protagoras 349 A,
ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A S; Plato Meno 91 15, ap. 'l5iels, op.
cit., 80 A 8 ; Diod. XII 53, 2 ap. DTe!i, op. cit., 82 A 4 ;
Xenoph. An. II 6 16, ap. Diels, op. cit., 82 A 5; Plato
Hipp. ~aj. 282 c; ap. D~els, op. cit., 84 A 3 ; Philostrat,
~op • I 11, 5, ap. D~els, op. cit., 86 A ; Plato Hippias
2
mai. 281 A, ap. Diels, op. cit., 86 A 7; Xenoph.
Mam. I 6, !
sq:, ap. Diels, op, cit., 87 A 3 •
--74. It is only fair to refer to Grote's position in the matter,
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for he rejects much of the ancient testimony on the Sophists.
In the famous 67th chapter of his Uistory ~ ~reege, he says,
referring to this testimony:
The libas of Aristophaes, the sneers of Plato
and Xenophon, even the interested generalities
of a plaintiff or defendant before a dikastery
are received with little cDoss-examinat~on as
authentic materials for history.
Zeller differs with Grote in many instances and Sedgwick and
Jackson qualify his statements.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated the translation of Plato's
works which I have used is that of Benjamin Jowett, and
the translation of Aristotles' works is that edited by
W. D. Ross.
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CHAPTER IV
Conclusion
In this conclusion it will be necessary to treat
o~

three points: the

e~~ects o~

brie~ly

the sophistic education, the

intrinsic good or evil of the features of that education which
Aristophanes censured, and the sincerity

o~

Aristophanes.

I

have grouped these three together in a final chapter partly because there is, perhaps, some relation between the three topics,
and partly because, since it is impossible to treat any of the
three satisfactorily in this thesis, I may as well handle all
the unsatisfactory matter at once.
In the first chapter of this discussion it was shown that
Aristophanes

himsel~

seemed to

~ear

the effects of Sophistic

education, and he contrasted the splendid youth developed by the
old education with the effeminate and corrupt product of the new
Moreover, he warned Athens that she would regret nursing the
Sophists who would turn out to be a brood of vipers.
Now it seems to me undeniable that Sophist education,

i~

it really was as Aristophanes and. other ancients portrayed it,
must have had a distinctly deleterious effect wherever it
~lourished.

To deny the objective validity of knowledge is

surely to admit that might is right,cal deduction from that denial.

l)to name but one logi-

The Sophist position on law

would necessarily tend to destroy respect for authority, and on
this respect the effectiveness of government depends.

2)

The
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son of Strepsiades, as he became learned in Sophistry, outgrew
filial virtue.

It is at least likely that the ADhenian, as he

became richer in the qualities of the Sophist, would grow poorer
in those of the citizen.

Likewise it is obvious that such eth-

ics as the Sophists are represented as teaching must destroy the
morals of those who accept them.

3)

The Clouds is, perhaps,

the saddest of comedies for it shows the ruinous results of the
Frankenstein monster, false education.

This sad comedy has but

too often been enacted on the stage of the world with history
for its setting.
As I say, it seems that Sophist education, if it was as
represented, must have wrought ill in Athens.

I~

however, we

approach the question from the other side and ask whether
according to history, bad effects actually resulted from Sophist
education, the answer is not sG easy.

First of alll one is

faced with the question of whether the Athens of the Sophists
was more corrupt than that of NJ.arathon days, and what were its
peculiar evils.

This in itself is hard enough.

Supposing that

one established the fact that there was a fund of corruption in
the Athens of the Sophist, he still would have to show a causal
relationship

be~Teen

Sophistic education and the evil.

Throughout he would find himself opposed by
sary not

4}

Grote, an adver-

apt to encourage one to open disagreement.

Here I wish merely to indicate the direction of my opinion, without making any effort to prove it.

That this opinion
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is supported, at least in part, by such men as Burnet, Zeller,
and Taylor, lends me courage. I believe that the Athens of 1he
Sophists had a peculiar corruption of its own (whether greater
or less than that of earlier time is not· so important here),
the nature of Which was such as Sophistic education, if it was
as the ancients represented it, would naturally produce. I
think tbat the plays of :EUripides, the Melian dialogue in Thucydides, and in general the history of the Peloponnesian war
as found in Thucydides are evideme of this. Further, I think
that the decadence of the Hellenic era can with some probability
be shown to have roots in the Sophistic education of an earlier
day. As partial corroboration of mat I have said, I wish to
quote Tayihor:
In the bounding strength that Athens felt
after throwing off Persia, development was
quickened. Her decades were as centuries ••••
Some of the causes vhich made her decline
as rapid as her growth are not far to
seek. She broke her power in the Peloponnesian war, her citizens grew loquacious; their spirit of devotion to ~heir
city waned with the period of faulty
action; they were engrossed with pleasure,
with their individual interests and
thoughts. And when afterwards Thebes
had roused herself for a mighty fling at
the Spartan's throat, and then sunk back
into Boeotian lethargy, and there was
no one but Athens to take the lead against
lf~cedon, she had no capacity for such
continuous self-denial and exertion as
were needed to uphold her freedom and
that of her rancorous neighbors against
the untiring king. 5)
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Sophist education, if it was as Aristophanes represented it,
could well have been partially responsible for such a condition in Athens.
There is also considerable difficulty in treating the
actual blameworthiness of the features of Sophist education
which Aristophmes criticized.

Here one is inevitably deter-

mined by his own philosophy, and the extent of possible discussion is so vast as to discourage beginning in a paper of
limited proportions.

Suffice it to point out the obvious - -

that if one believes at all in the possibility of a complete
and systematic metaphysics and ethics, he can not but shun the
principles of the Sophists. Further, if my opinion of the
effects of sophist education is correct, one must surely suspect intrinsic evil in the cause of those effects.
It is hard to see on what grounds the eristic and
rhetoric of the Sophists could merit unqualified defense, if
it was as represented by the ancients.

As to their religious

skepticism, however, argument could easily arise.

I believe

that it was a serious defect because it substituted a greater
evil for a lesser.

Pagan theology, I think, is better than no

theology.
The tendency of the Sophists to polymathy is obviously
reprehensible only in so far as it resulted in superficiality.
Finally, it ishard to see in what sense the charging of
fees for inst:ruction can be intrinsically evil.

The people of
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Aristophanesr time, nurtured in the opposite tradition, found
the novelty a shock to their sense of what is fitting - and who
can say whether they were hypersensitive or we are callous?
Today we are thoroughly accustomed to the practise.
Though in my opinion - and I think this would be the
common belief - the qualities for which Aristophanes answered
the Sophist education were in the main {at least the ethics,
eristic, rhetoric, and religious skepticism)

~

great evils,

I do not think that the education performed no good in Athens.
It met a real need for an education of larger scope.

It had a

salutary e£fect, though rather accidentally, in kicking over the
muddled traces o£ a lost philosophy, so that thought could begin
anew in the direction given it by Socrates.

Moreover, the great

sophists contributed in a real way to the knowledge o£ rhetoric,
gr~ar,

and language.

Irm not at all sure that these true

merits of the Sophists were recognized by their ancient critics.
Finally, we arrive at the last difficult problem - that
o£ the sincerity of Aristophanes.

Unfortunately, this question

must remain forever undecided, and the best that can be hoped
for is a well-founded opinion.

It is hard enough to determine

the actual convictions of the author o£ any satire; but when
that satire happens to come to us in the form of a Greek comady
written about a subject as elusive as the Sophists, and that ove1
two thousand years ago, the difficulty assumes alarming proportions.
First o£ all, Greek comedy was by its tradition compelled
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to be conservative, so that if Aristophanes wanted to write
about the Sophists, he had to appear to oppose them.

How can

one be sure that he was not really sympathetic with the movement and ridiculing it with his tongue in his cheek,?
One who wishes to accept this view does not have to look
far for arguments to support it.

To begin with, Aristophanes

makes much in the Clouds of the religious skepticism of the
Sophists; yet a consideration of his other plays - e.g., the
P~tus

- might

le~d

one to question whether he himself was a

particularly reverent and devout believer.

Then there is the

impossible difficulty which arises from his having apparently
identified Socrates with the Sophists in the Clouds.

Of what

value, it might be asked, is the criticism of a man who simply
for comic effect, classes among his Sophists one so opposite
to them as Socrates?

Without intention of answering the ques-

tion, I should like to suggest that it may not have been so
difficult to mistake Socrates, as he was at the time the Clou4s
was written, for a Sophist.
These difficulties and the general tendency of the
elusive Aristophanes to hide behind the comic mask have caused
one school of critics to conclude that this man was simply a
comedian and had but one purpose, to raise a laugh.

Diametri-

cally opposed to this school are those critics who see in Aristophanes a deep thinking and earnest moral reformer, using his
comedy merely as a means to rescue his fellow men from the evils
of the day.

There is a classic expression of this view in
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Browning's

Aristop~~·

Apology.

As always there is a group seeking to steer a middle
course.

Gilbert Murray and other critics see in Aristophanes

a man who was first and foremost a comic poet, but who had
nevertheless a serious moral purpose.
most likely.

This view seems to me

I think it difficult to deny that Aristophanes

was greatly concerned, as a comic poet should be, to amuse his
audience.

Perhaps he sometimes sacrificed truth and accuracy

to this end.

However, I think it equally hard to deny that he

was generally

expressing his own sincere and keenly felt con-

victions.

This I believe to be the case in the criticism of

the Sophists in the

~~'

for reasons I shall now present.

First of all Aristophanes' plays show him to be certainly
a man of keen intellectual perception.

Now it seems to me im-

probable, though by no means impossible, that such a man could
write a searching satire on a subject of so great importance af
his time as the Sophistic education, and not mean it.

It

be~ol'tles

more improbable when we consider that this criticism found L1
this satire tallies almost perfectly with the other contemporary
criticism.
Then we know that Aristophanes was prosecuted by Cleon
and made to suffer for an attack made in an early play on this
demagogue.

Later, in the Knights, he risked a second fierce

attack on Cleon.

This is not the conduct of a man who holds his

convictions lightly.
Also, I believe a passage in the

Fro~

is n0teworthy in

in this connection.
~

There Aeschylus says to Euripides;
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Now I think it likely that Aristophanes was voicing there his
own opinion of the function of the poet.

It is surely unlikely

that a man with such a lofty concept of the poet's function
would in his own poetry express other than his sincere convictions.
These arguments, I confess, are at best persuasive.
Stronger than all of them, I believe, is the very spirit of the
Clouds.

It seems to me evident from the mere reading that the

play is serious.

But such a thing is not demonstrable.

Finis
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Notes on Chapter IV
1. This conclusion is surely obvious. SUbjective truth is no
better than opinion. If all knowledge is mere opinion then,
accepting human nature as it is, it is but natural that the
opinion of the stronger should prevail.
2. This is a part of the thesis of Guglielmo Ferrero's book:
The Ruin of Ancient Civilization and the Triumph of

mir'i'B-E'Ii'rifi'y.

-

-

-

3. This ethics was the more dangerous when coupled with skill

in rhetoric and eristic.

Cf. Medea, (11. 579 sq.):

Truly, I am in many respects different from
most mortals, for in my opinion whatever
man being unjust, is naturally clever at
speaking ;<.:.he deserves the greatest punishment. - (my tra•slation)
4. Here, too, one would have to treat the difficult question of
whether the Sophists produced the times or the times the
Sophists. r , In this connection one recalls Plato's statement:
The 'Sophists' only teach the views of the
majority, just as one might study the
nature of a great fierce beast, and put
his observations in the for.m of art.
(Rep. - Quoted by Starkie, Clouds £! ~·
p. XVIII, n. 4.}
5. Henry Osborn Taylor, Ancient Ideals, p. 344.
6. Frogs, 11. 1008-1010
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